full statement by the inspector-general of police

by:Gewinn     2020-06-02
Inspector\'s press release
On the evening of November 10, 2003, two intelligence delegates from the United States and the United Kingdom, the chief police officer, were responsible for investigating the production of components according to the Libyan uranium enrichment project. e.
The CIA and MI6 met with the director of the special service, Buji Oman.
Their discussions focused on ongoing investigations related to international networks suspected of involvement in the transfer of nuclear technology to third countries.
Both delegates asked for common
The operation of special branches that prevent the spread of nuclear technology.
They also provided information related to joint operations. INFORMATION2.
The information passed is: 2.
The participation of a Pakistani nuclear scientist confirmed that a Pakistani nuclear weapons expert was involved in \"the further spread of Pakistan\'s nuclear technology to third countries, especially Libya \". \"2.
Posse tahill claims that the Sri Lankan businessman based in Dubai, Posse tahill, a trusted close friend of weapons experts, is actively involved in supplying centrifuge components for uranium in Libya
Enrichment scheme; and2.
3 SCOMI Precision Engineering son BHD (
SCOPE claims that Tahir, who is involved in the SCOPE business, uses the company to produce components for the centrifuge units of the uranium enrichment project.
However, the survey shows that the components themselves cannot form a complete centrifuge unit.
In this regard, it must be noted that SCOPE is a subsidiary of SCOMI Group BHD. e.
A company engaged in the oil service industry.
As a subsidiary, SCOPE is also involved in the production of components for a variety of equipment, including automotive, oil and gas parts, for precision engineering services. 3.
In this regard, the Special Branch was also informed that on October 4, 2003, a vessel called BBC China was inspected in the Italian port of Taranto, which was owned by a German company, five containers shipped to Libya were confiscated because they were believed to contain components related to the Libyan uranium enrichment programme.
The components are said to be packed in wooden cases with the SCOPE logo on them.
With this development, there was a request to assist in the investigation of activities with tahill and his relationship with Pakistani scientists, as \"very interested in this issue --
The highest level of the US/UK government \". \'4.
Following this development, the police launched an investigation to understand the real situation and its impact on the interests and security of Malaysia. BRIEFING5.
According to the survey, the Prime Minister was briefed on November 13, 2003.
He ordered a detailed and transparent investigation to be expedited.
Meanwhile, the inspector-
The police chief was notified.
He ordered the investigation to continue.
Police investigation 6.
In carrying out this investigation, the Special Branch took into account the above situation
The allegations referred to and focus on the following :-6.
1 accused Tahir of playing a middleman role in supplying some of Malaysia\'s centrifuge components for uranium in Libya
Enrichment scheme; 6.
2 Allegations of scope; and6.
3 Other relevant information. 7.
As a responsible member of the United Nations (UN)
It is Malaysia\'s responsibility to investigate and inform any activities involving nuclear proliferation.
In connection with this, Malaysia is
Cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
A United Nations agency responsible for the implementation of rules and regulations for the control of nuclear weapons under non-nuclear-weapon States
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
This is to ensure that the investigation is thorough and without doubt.
In this regard, through joint consultations, two preliminary reports were submitted to the IAEA department of safeguards in Vienna
Operation and help of the Director-
Director General of the atomic Licensing Commission (AELB)
An official at the Institute of Nuclear Technology in Malaysia and Malaysia (MINT).
A complete report will also be submitted to the IAEA to assist the agency in the investigation of individuals or companies suspected of participating in related activities outside Malaysia.
Background of Tahir8.
Posse tahill, full name buhary seyed abu Tahir, 44 years old, is a Sri Lankan citizen and a businessman in Dubai.
Posse tahill owns a company with his brother. e.
He is managing director of the GROUP at smb group in Dubai.
In 1998, Posse tahill married a Malaysian woman and received permanent residency in Malaysia.
Founded in 1980, smb group is a family-owned business and is now involved in computer and IT.
In general, Posse tahill takes the time to oversee his business in Dubai and occasionally returns to Malaysia to visit his wife\'s family or look for business opportunities. 9.
After his father\'s death in 1985, Posse tahill took over the management of small and medium-sized enterprises and visited Pakistan in the process, successfully obtaining a contract to sell air conditioning equipment to Khan Research laboratory (KRL).
During this period, tahill met with Pakistani nuclear experts.
At the same time, Posse tahill met intermediaries from other countries, including Europe, who, on behalf of Pakistan\'s nuclear experts, were involved in the supply of uranium centrifuge components.
Temporary operation.
The survey shows that middlemen are cautious in the way they supply parts, and suppliers from other countries are also involved to cover up the source of parts.
It is believed that some suppliers are aware that these components may be used for uranium enrichment centrifuges.
Generally speaking, these suppliers are mostly from Europe and are suppliers who have been dealing with nuclear experts since the 1980 generation when developing nuclear technology in Pakistan.
There are individuals and companies that provide these components but are not aware of the impact because some of them are similar to those used in oil drilling, and several other water treatment and equipment for general use.
Early Participation
Supply centrifuge to iran11.
During the investigation, Posse tahill claimed that his contact with nuclear experts began at some point in 1994/1995.
In the same year, the latter demanded that posse tahill deliver two containers of used centrifuges from Pakistan to Iran.
Posse tahill used a merchant ship owned by an Iranian company to organize the transfer of two containers from Dubai to Iran.
Posse tahill said that Iran paid for the two container centrifuge units in UAE dirham currency for about $3 million.
Cash in two briefcases and in an apartment, Pakistani nuclear weapons experts use it as a guesthouse every time they visit DubaiBACKGROUND to learn about their relationship with Libya.
According to posse tahill, Libya contacted nuclear weapons experts in 1997 to obtain assistance and expertise in the field of uranium enrichment centrifuge.
Several meetings were held by weapons experts and delegates from Libya :-12.
At a meeting in Islamabad sometime in 1997.
At this meeting, nuclear weapons experts were accompanied by posse Tahir, while Libya was represented by Mohammed Matuk Mohammed and another person known only as KARDVI.
At this meeting, the Libyan people asked weapons experts to provide centrifuges for Libya\'s nuclear program; and12.
Between 1998 and 2002.
During this period, the weapons experts held several meetings with posé tahill and the Libyan people, led by Mohammed Matu Mohammed.
A discussion was held in Casablanca, Morocco, and several discussions were held in Dubai. 13.
The following progress has been made in these meetings :-13.
Around 2001, experts on nuclear arms told posse tahill,)
A certain amount of UF6 (
Enriched uranium)
Air from Pakistan to Libya.
Posse tahill can\'t remember the name of the Pakistani airline that shipped uranium; 13.
2001/2002 years.
Nuclear weapons experts told posse tahill Tata that some centrifuge units were flown directly from Pakistan to Libya.
The design of the centrifuge unit sent may be the PI model, I . E. e.
Model of Dutch design; and13.
3 Project machine shop 1001.
This is a project to build a workshop in Libya to manufacture centrifuge components, which cannot be obtained from outside Libya.
The machines in the workshop were obtained from Spain and Italy.
The man in the middle of the project is Peter Griffin, a British citizen believed to have owned the Gulf technology industry (GTI)based in Dubai.
Peter Griffin is said to have retired and lived in France.
His son, Paul Griffin, took over the administration of GTI.
Tahill also said the plan for the 1001 machine store was prepared by Peter Griffin. NETWORKING14.
Tahill said Pakistan urgently needs to produce nuclear weapons after India conducted a nuclear weapons test in May 18, 1974.
In view of this, the Kahuta nuclear power plant was built, and nuclear weapons experts were forced to carefully obtain equipment from developed countries, especially Europe.
In the process, he established contacts to obtain the required materials from several countries.
This must be done cautiously, as Pakistan has had to develop nuclear weapons for defense after India\'s nuclear test was opposed by many Western countries.
In these difficulties, the nuclear experts have successfully developed a network of middlemen, involving not only posse tahill, but also some people and companies in Europe seeking to make profits through sales, certain materials and equipment.
However, it is a loose network with no strict hierarchy and no so-called supervisor and deputy supervisor. 15.
According to posse tahill, some middlemen seem to have known the nuclear expert for a long time, some of whom met him while he was in the Netherlands.
The middlemen allegedly in contact with him include :-15.
Engineer of month GERMANYLate Heinz MEBUS.
He was allegedly involved in discussions between nuclear weapons experts and ERAN to provide design for about 1984/85 of centrifuges. 15.
German citizen lerthard LERCH living in Switzerland.
Lerthard LERCH has worked for the German company Lebao HERAEUS, which allegedly produces vacuum technology equipment.
Gotthard lerch allegedly tried to obtain the pipeline supply for the machine store 1001 project by purchasing from South Africa, but failed to obtain it, despite payments made earlier in Libya. 15.
A Turkish citizen who has worked for Siemens in Germany.
Gunas jereh allegedly provided aluminum castings and generators to Libya at the request of nuclear weapons experts; 15.
Selem alguadis, a Jewish citizen of Turkey.
Engineers, too.
Suspected supplier of electrical cabinets and power supplies-
Voltage Regulator in Libya
On October 4, 2003, two weeks after Taranto, Italy, took action against the BBC China ship, Posse Tucker was accused of arranging the transfer of the cabinet and electricity supplier.
The voltage regulator represents selem alguadis to Libya through Dubai. 15.
British king Griffin, a British citizen, has commercial interests in Dubai and currently lives in France. Alleged-
Layout Plan for machine workshop-
1001 as a workshop to enable Libya to produce centrifuge components; 15.
About 2001/2002, Peter Griffin allegedly provided a lathe to Libya for the machine shop 1001 project.
After that, Peter Griffin arranged to send seven to eight Libyan technicians to Spain twice to take courses on how to operate the machine.
At the same time, it is said that Peter Griffin also provided an Italian --
Built a stove to Libya for the workshop.
Generally, the lathe is used to make cylindrical objects, and in the process of making certain components, the furnace is essential in the process of heating and refining; 15.
It is alleged that the mechanical engineer, fridges landfridges TINNER, has been dealing with nuclear weapons experts since the 1980 s.
It is reported that Friedman TINNER has prepared certain centrifuge components, including safety valves, who have purchased many materials produced by several European companies.
Instead of keeping stock on its own, fridrishi Tinner arranged for supplies to arrive in Dubai and then to arrive in Libya.
Friedman TINNER is also president of CETEC, Switzerland; and15.
Month\'s \"urban renewal strategy\" can-do for the son of fridrish White Ironman.
Bsa tinner is a consultant for the establishment of a range plant in Shah Alam arranged by posse tahill.
He actively participated in the manufacturing business of the factory. 16.
Although the above-mentioned individuals were allegedly involved in the matter, the relevant national government and a number of relevant companies provided these components to the above-mentioned individuals, and I am not aware of the real use of the components.
Charges against scope17.
The special office also investigated allegations regarding the scope of use of posse tahill and the manufacture of certain parts of the centrifuge unit by business.
The inspection of the records of the Malaysian Security Council shows that the scope or Scomi Precision Engineering Sdn. Bhd.
It was established as a subsidiary of Scomi group in December 4, 2001.
Before SCOPE was established as a subsidiary of Scomi, it was called Prisma Wibawa Sdn. Bhd. (PWSB).
At first, PWSB did not have production facilities, but after SCOPE was established, production facilities were established in 2001. 18.
Scope\'s business is precision engineering services.
Typically, SCOPE receives orders from multiple companies to provide parts or components for vehicle parts and for processing high-precision parts.
This work involves the processing of parts such as cutting, turning and milling.
The range factory is located in Shah Alam with a long term staff of about 30 people.
Therefore, it is not a very large complex factory compared to other factories. 19.
The results of the annual survey are as follows :-
The role of BSA tahir19.
At some point in 2001, it was alleged that posse tahill was planning to make parts in Turkey with gunas jireh.
However, Posse tahill later changed his mind and came up with a new business plan, which is said to be legal and can produce components of oil and gas.
The staff was under the impression that the product was produced for oil and gas prepared for Dubai.
Fridrich TINNER19. the role of Tiantai building
Following this development, Posse tahill sent URS fririch TINNER as a consultant to the scope plant with the aim of providing expert advice on how to make components in a business considered legitimate. 19.
As we all know, Friedman TINNER, 39, is the son of Friedman TINNER.
Urs tinner was made a complete
According to the suggestion of posse tahill, the time Technical Consultant started working from April 2002.
According to posse tahill, urs tinner was recommended after Peter Griffin was found not suitable for the job.
Prior to that, Peter Griffin proposed a feasibility study that recommended, among other things, the required mechanical types.
One of the machines, the Cincinnati Eagle 150 machining center, is the same as the machines purchased and installed by urs tinner.
This evidence was found in a document allegedly a short note signed by Peter Griffin himself on March 10, 2001. 19.
As a consultant, urs tinner is responsible for importing and installing the machines purchased through his father\'s fririch TINNER service.
There are also machines imported through the Swiss company Traco, which are owned by urs tinner\'s brother marco tinner.
The types of machines purchased and repaired by urs tinner include CNC lathe Hawk (Cincinnati)
Arrow 500, a CNC machining center from the UK (Cincinnati)
Mexica 590 CNC lathe from the United Kingdom (Cazeneuve)
155 from France and Emco PC from the UK.
Two other machines made in Taiwani. e.
Automatic cutting machine with knife (Averizing)
Universal tool grinding machine (Monaset)
It was bought from a local agent. 20.
Throughout his entire process at the scope plant, the scope staff felt that urs tinner was careful to perform his duties and that he would always take back the component drawings once the components were completed.
Urs tinner is also said to have done so to protect trade secrets.
At that time, the staff accepted his explanation.
No doubt. 21.
Many scope staff also indicated that urs tinner would remove all technical drawings saved in the scope factory computer.
On October 2003, urs tinner ended his service term at the scope factory, before which he was said to have taken a tough line
A disc designated by the company for the computer he uses.
It is said that urs tinner also obtained his personal file from the records of the scope factory.
It gives the impression that urs tinner does not want to leave any traces of his presence there and wants to make sure
The technical drawings did not fall into the hands of the range factory staff.
However, urs tinner left me a machine. e.
Turn the machine manually.
This is the 1948 model made by Swiss schauberia.
This machine has never been used. 22.
The staff of SCOPE did not know that on October 4, 2003, a ship called BBC China was inspected in the port of Taranto, and Italy confiscated a total of 5 containers destined for Libya, because these containers allegedly contain parts of certain parts of the centrifuge unit.
In fact, urs tinner also left his position as a consultant in October 2003.
Material for manufacturing parts s23.
The survey shows that the raw materials for manufacturing these components are obtained from the German subsidiary I. e.
Bikar metal Private Limited, Singapore.
Purchased and obtained a total of 300 metric tons of aluminum grade 6061 and 6082 from Bikar metal in the form of round rods or round tubes.
These materials are not controlled items.
As a result, urs tinner suggested the purchase, which did not raise any concern or suspicion from the scope staff.
Manufacturing and export.
Material obtained from Bikar metal I. e.
Lv yuan guan and lv yuan bang is semi-
Finished products sent to the Shah Alam range factory for processing will be processed into export parts.
The order for Posey Tucker is one-
The estimated output was about RMB yuan and was sent to Dubai in four stages.
It\'s not a long time-
Regular contracts on an ongoing basis. 25.
The range factory records show that a total of 14 types of components were manufactured.
Components are sent in four stages. e.
From December 2002 to August 2003.
All four shipments were delivered to Dubai. 26.
Documents, delivery notes/packing lists dated August 1, 2002 (Appendix \"A\")
Show SCOPE has sent a shipment to Gulf technology industries LCCO.
Box 29576, Dubai, UAE, this shipment is for the Desert Electrical Equipment Factory, P. O.
Dubai, box 51209, as instructed by urs tinner.
Documents relating to delivery to the desert electrical equipment plant are shown in Annex \"B \". 27.
From documents retrieved such as \"delivery and packing list\", SCOPE was found to ship only components to Dubai.
Documents proving that SCOPE had delivered or exported the above components to Libya were not tracked.
It is said that only posse tahill and ulles Tinner are aware of any preparations or arrangements in Libya.
Search on bbc china vess28.
As explained, on October 4, 2003, a vessel called BBC China was searched in the Italian port of Taranto, where a total of five containers destined for Libya were seized, after allegations had been made
The containers were flown by air from Dubai.
Several items in the container called the \"centrifuge\" assembly are as follows: describe the part number total 28.
1 casing 4 2,20828.
2 Molecular Pump 5 2,20828.
3 top gasket 6\' 60828.
4 locator 8 10, 54928.
5 Top 9 1,68028.
6 collision ring 12 2,20828.
7 fixed tube 59 1,05628. 8 Clamp holder-73 40028.
9 flange 77 4,52529.
All of the above items are made from \"quality alumni\" and placed in wooden boxes with range marks.
This is part of the \"transshipment\" that SCOPE has delivered to Dubai\'s Yashi trading company.
Posse tahill has shipped items or components to Libya through BBC Chinese ships, which is out of management. 30.
Photographs of the above items or components were presented to the local experts of the Atomic Energy Licensing Commission (AELB)
Responsible for the implementation of the IAEA guidelines (IAEA)
With the IAEA safeguards system in Malaysia and the Institute of Nuclear Technology in Malaysia (MINT).
They acknowledge that well-trained eyes like them find it difficult to be sure that the seized ingredients are part of a \"centrifugal\" device.
This is because the above components can also be used in other industries besides nuclear technology.
It is important and necessary to understand the existence of a secret international network that plans to provide centrifuge components to Libya before making any assumptions about its use.
In connection with this, it is appropriate to extract the AELB view of the inspected part: \"The set of graphic images presented may be part of many possible mechanical devices or devices.
These parts can be easily installed into many industrial or home components.
Without knowing all or most of the total number of sub-components, the allocation of possible devices shall not be finally used \"(
See Appendix \"C\" for photos of parts seized by BBC China \")
Other information related to the operation of the BBC china31.
In view of the following allegations by posse tahill, the action against the BBC\'s Chinese ships should also be suspected: 31.
Posse tahill claimed that, along with the components seized on the BBC China ship on October 4, 2003, they were goods sent by gunas jireh, a Turkish national, provide \"aluminum castings and generators\" for the \"machine store 1001\" project in Libya \".
These items use Tut Shipping through Dubai (TS)
BBC China Channel
It is surprising that goods from gunas jireh are allowed to be shipped directly to Libya without any action; and31.
Two weeks after taking action against the BBC China, Posse tahill claimed that it had arranged for \"transshipment of electrical cabinets and power suppliers\"
Represents the voltage regulator of selevi alguadis through Dubai to Libya.
This shipment also arrived in Libya without any hindrance, which is unusual.
Selevi alguadis is said to have known nuclear weapons experts since the 19 th century 80 s.
In general, the results of the survey are as follows: 32.
Scope Management is not aware that the exported components are part of certain centrifuge installations in Libya.
The scope of management believes that this is a legitimate business transaction.
For untrained eyes, these parts do not cause any attention, as these parts are similar to those that can be used by \"gasoline\"
Chemical industry, water treatment and other industries. 32.
Get Half range 2
The production of finished products of the above components from Bikar metal, Germany, gives the impression that these items are not controlled items.
In view of the above, the work carried out in the semi-finals
The finished product is legal and will not cause doubt. 32.
3. BSA ir and urs tinner did not announce the use of components or the true nature of the business.
In addition, the confiscated components cannot be used as a complete unit of the centrifuge.
Important components such as rotating components in rotor motors or technical terms are not in the captured components.
In addition, the scope does not have the ability or technical knowledge to produce it.
It must be emphasized that rotating components are essential for centrifuge units in the uranium enrichment process.
In order to make a centrifuge unit, some complex components are required, and only 12 types of components are prepared in the range.
In fact, the scope is misled to make components for the dual purpose of the oil and ga6 industries.
So far, no factory in Malaysia has been able to manufacture a complete centrifuge unit, and more importantly, thousands of centrifuges have been built. 32.
In the range of 4, the so-called centrifuge component manufacturing is-
An estimated shutdown of 13 million yuan.
This means that SCOPE has not received any further orders, so the manufacturing of these components is not its core business.
As a result, the statement that Malaysian authorities shut down one of the network\'s largest factories has been exaggerated. 33.
In this regard/Malaysia is a signatory to the non-proliferation treaty (NPT).
The non-proliferation treaty in general oversees the control of nuclear materials such as uranium, thorium and plutonium.
The manufacture, use or import and export of uranium and plutonium and other materials that can be converted into uranium are controlled by the non-proliferation treaty.
All states that have signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, including Malaysia, must report to the International Atomic Energy Agency all stocks, as well as the import and export of nuclear materials (IAEA)
The IAEA, based in Vienna, Austria, is the executive body of the non-proliferation treaty.
However, it cannot control nuclear equipment such as centrifuge components.
Therefore, Malaysia has not violated any of the non-proliferation treaty rules, as it is not included in the items listed in the non-proliferation treaty.
In addition, Malaysia has not yet signed the Additional Protocol to the IAEA implementation control agreement.
In general, the additional protocol ensures control over specific nuclear equipment such as a single nuclear equipment
Use items that include materials such as uranium enrichment centrifuges.
However, this additional agreement does not include double
Use items such as centrifuges for petrochemicals, water treatment, and molecular biology for healthy protein separation.
Therefore, Malaysia is not a party to the additional protocol and does not violate any of the provisions of the Additional Protocol, as the components seized in the port of Taranto, Italy, are essential components and are not complete centrifuges for uranium enrichment.
In addition, under the Malaysian Atomic Energy Licensing Act (Act 304)
According to the law, there is no provision for the control of these components seized. 34.
It is clear from the above explanation that the scope is not in violation of the non-proliferation treaty, the Additional Protocol and the Malaysian law (Act 304).
It is clear that the majority of individuals involved in the network are from Europe, their countries are signatories to the additional protocol and members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).
As such, these countries are governed by the rules and regulations already in place, including reporting to the IAEA any transaction of specific materials using nuclear weapons.
Germany signed the Additional Protocol on September 22, 1998 and is a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
It is therefore the responsibility of Bikar Metal to report to the government of Germany and the IAEA
It turned out to be finished.
Listed as controlled items provided to SCOPE. CONCLUSION35.
The police took an open and transparent approach in handling the investigation.
In this regard, a complete report related to the investigation will be submitted to AELB, Malaysia, and reported to the IAEA, a subsidiary of the United Nations.
This is in line with Malaysia\'s policy of recognizing multilateral trade agreements.
In conjunction with the IAEA, a horizontal approach is adopted to reject unilateral practices that are exclusively investigated by certain states.
Malaysian authorities are ready
Cooperate with the IAEA if further investigation is required. 36.
It is hoped that the agency will begin an investigation into several Europeans who are allegedly involved in the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
The investigation conducted by the Malaysian authorities proves that the country is committed to supporting efforts to curb the illegal transfer and proliferation of nuclear technology.
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